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Human rights treaties are the main legal instrument used by the United Nations to advance 
human rights. While many treaties are ratified by the world, rights violations still happen, 
especially for women. The purpose of this study is to discover if states obey and follow 
international human rights law on women’s rights and protect the rights defined in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This analysis 
employed a case study methodology that compares four states: Sweden, Latvia, Libya, and the 
United Arab Emirates and their women’s rights practices. The United Nations Universal Periodic 
Review process, the ratification of Optional Protocols, and treaty reservations are analyzed to 
reveal if international law influences state behavior. I found that international law is not a major 
variable that affects the behavior of a state. Rather, the culture and sovereignty of a state 
determine if states follow international law requirements. This scholarship is critical because it 
illuminated that the international community and global governance lack legitimacy and 
authority over individual states. This calls into question the ability of international law to protect 
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Chapter 1: Human Rights in International Law 
1.1 Introduction 
The international community promotes various areas of human rights through international 
treaties. Much of the treaties crafted by the United Nations (UN) receive overwhelming support 
from member states. Core human rights treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have global support in the form of treaty 
ratifications (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018). The 
ICCPR has 172 ratifications, the ICESCR has 169 ratifications, the CRC has 196 ratifications, 
the CEDAW has 189 ratifications, and the CERD has 179 ratifications (United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018). In spite of the popularity of these treaties, 
countless human rights violations still happen across the world. Cultural relativism, state 
sovereignty, treaty reservations, and the gap between ratification and actual compliance with 
treaty laws have impeded the spread and protection of human rights. The influence of 
international law and global governance and treaties are vital variables in international human 
rights law. This project focuses on the protection of women’s rights and explores one question: 
does international law change state behavior? This research will reveal if the forces of 
international law and global governance is working and can solve transnational conflicts. 
 
 




1.2 Literature Review: Sovereignty Contradicts International Law 
The UN member states create human rights treaties that protect different areas of human rights 
such as civil and political rights, women’s rights, and children’s rights. The treaties are legally 
binding meaning that states that ratified the treaties must follow the treaty provisions (Murphy 
2012). Some treaties have Optional Protocols which are attached to the core treaties. Optional 
Protocols add new enforcement procedures and human rights laws (Cole 2009). States choose 
whether or not they want to support a human rights treaty. There are three actions a state can 
take. First, states can take no action where they reject the content of the treaty and are not legally 
bound to it (Murphy 2012). Second, states can sign treaties which illustrates the support of states 
for the principles of the treaty, but the states are not legally bound by it (Murphy 2012). Lastly, 
states can ratify the treaty where they will be fully bound to the provisions of the treaty (Murphy 
2012).  
State ratification of human rights treaties can be misleading. States that ratify human 
rights treaties do not always follow the laws of the treaties. It is possible that a state can ratify a 
particular human rights treaty and continue to not protect the rights in the treaty in its domestic 
political practice. The gap between treaty ratifications and human rights rhetoric and actual 
human rights compliance has attracted many scholars. 
Scholars suggested that international law has been mostly unable to change the behavior 
of states through treaties. States ratify human rights treaties because it is in their self interest to 
do so. Murphy (2012) posits that states may ratify treaties for legitimacy and global acceptance, 
because of fear of reciprocity from other states, and to create and sustain a positive reputation in 
the international system. Wotipka and Tsutsui (2008) reveal that social norms in international 




treaty making are critical to explaining state ratification behavior. They conclude that states 
ratify treaties to gain legitimacy in the international society, obscure their poor human rights 
records, and comply with international law norms. In these cases, states are primarily concerned 
with their reputation and how they are perceived on the world stage. The big takeaway from the 
study is that “Among the arguments concerned with the influence of global human rights norms, 
we find robust support for the normative pressure and imitation arguments” (Wotipka and 
Tsutsui 2008, 748). In fact, “It appears that ratification by other countries within a region impacts 
subsequent ratification by others in that same region.” (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008, 747). In other 
words, states ratify treaties if other states in its region have done so as well. 
Also, it is possible that states are more influenced by their domestic politics. Wang’s 
(2016) investigation looked into the domestic realm of state ratification. Wang notes that states 
will ratify human rights treaties to signal a future policy plan to its domestic audience. This is 
done to appease domestic constituents who may be pushing for more human rights at the 
domestic level. In this sense, states are more swayed by internal political forces rather than 
international law. 
Moreover, treaty reservations and cultural relativism have allowed states to not comply 
with international law standards. Cultural relativism is the idea that norms are relative to the 
culture in which they are created (Churchill 2006, 48). Jones (2017) and Davies (2014) analyze 
the ratification behavior of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Jones finds that “ASEAN states positions are generally in line positions of guarding sovereignty 
and cultural relativity, specific to each member state” (20). Jones’ study is enlightening because 
he studies the nature of treaty reservations. He discovers that many of the reservations deal with 




claims to state sovereignty and cultural differences. Many of the cultural claims reference 
incompatibility with Islam. In addition, Davies (2014) studied the relationship between state 
ratification of human rights treaties and state compliance for ASEAN states. He observed that 
“despite a growing number of treaty ratifications, compliance with the standards those treaties 
include remains elusive” (414). Davies also highlights the contradicting nature of ASEAN states 
reservations. Davies and Jones both find that the reservations oppose the treaties because of 
culture and sovereignty. Therefore, sovereignty and cultural relativism are two threats to 
compliance with international law. 
Also, ASEAN states are not members to the Optional Protocols and fail to submit their 
human rights reports on time to the UN Universal Periodic Review. Indeed, Davies reports that 
“the United Nations recorded an “on-time” submission rate of just 16% for all relevant Treaty 
Bodies” (423). This report solidifies that treaty ratification is weak at predicting the compliance 
of human rights treaties and improving domestic human rights practice. 
Furthermore, international law fails to change state behavior because of the design of its 
treaties and state sovereignty. Cole (2009) explains why states ratify some human rights treaties 
over others. Cole portrays that states are more likely to ratify treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms than treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms. Cole asserts that most human 
rights treaties have weak measures to address state accountability. Weak enforcement 
mechanisms are contained within the standard human rights treaties, while the strict mechanisms 
are in the Optional Protocols to treaties. The Optional Protocols are strict because they 
implement an individual petition system which gives people the power to challenge their state 
over a human rights abuse. Treaties are enforced through human rights reports sent to the United 




Nations Universal Periodic Review. The reports are reviewed by the United Nations and they 
suggest what a state has to do to improve its human rights standings according to international 
law standards. Since the United Nations can only make recommendations that are fully 
dependent on the state to be implemented, the accountability measures for breaking the rules of a 
human rights treaty are weak. A state can make no significant changes to its human rights 
practices and face no severe punishment. The study revealed that the individual petition system 
was used the most out of the other monitoring systems and that “The state-to-state complaint 
mechanism has never been invoked, presumably because of the generalized sovereignty costs 
involved” (581). Cole’s major finding is that the austerity of the enforcement mechanism of a 
treaty is significant and a predictor of state ratification. 
To the contrary, Nielsen and Simmons (2015) state that ratification of human rights 
treaties is not done entirely out of self interest. They looked for empirical evidence that illustrates 
if states receive tangible and intangible rewards for ratifying human rights treaties. They define 
tangible goods as trade deals, increases in foreign aid, and more foreign direct investment. 
Intangible goods are praise from other governments and organizations, feeling accepted by the 
international community, avoidance of criticism, and gaining legitimacy. This analysis 
highlighted that states receive no tangible and intangible goods when they are ratifiers of human 
rights treaties. Also, the European Union and the United States did not praise or accept states for 
their ratification of human rights treaties. Nielsen and Simmons write, “Nor is there much 
evidence that states regularly receive intangible rewards for human rights treaty ratification. 
Resulting praise from the European Union is weak at best. The US State Department utterly 
ignores treaty ratification in its public statements” (206). There was also no evidence of praise 




from nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International (Nielsen and Simmons 2015). 
Furthermore, there were no economic benefits for ratifying treaties. Foreign aid, investment, and 
trade deals did not increase because of the ratification status of a state. In fact, state officials 
from Germany and Norway explained that foreign aid was not dependent on the ratification 
status of a state and even noted that the actual compliance and practice of human rights mattered 
more (Nielsen and Simmons 2015). Overall, economic benefits and intangible goods do not 
increase for states that ratified human rights treaties. 
The scholarship on state compliance with international law and treaties presents the UN 
human rights regime as ineffective and that states do not follow the norms of international law. 
While the previous literature focused primarily on compliance with human rights treaties, the 
process of international legal norms being passed down from international law institutions to 
state policies has not been studied to the same extent. This thesis augments the past studies by 
analyzing state compliance with the UN human rights regime.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
This research tests two hypotheses. First, western democracies are more responsive and 
compliant to international law standards and requirements than non-western regions. This 
hypothesis addresses the argument of cultural relativism which was observed in the works of 
Davies (2014) and Jones (2017). Second, states ratified to additional and specific protocols are 
more responsive and compliant to international law than states that have only adopted general 
conventions. This hypothesis addresses the impact of the strict enforcement mechanisms 
highlighted by Cole (2009). Ultimately, this methodology can identify if differences in regions, 




culture, and accession to the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW impact state human rights 
practice.  
Table 1: Case Selection 
Freedom Level Ratified to General 
Convention 
Ratified to Specific Protocol 
High Sweden and Latvia Sweden 
Low Libya and UAE Libya 
 
Four case studies are examined in this analysis. The cases are individual states which 
include Sweden, Latvia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Cases were chosen based 
on their ratification to the CEDAW and its Optional Protocol, as well as geography and culture. 
Sweden and Latvia will form a Europe case study, while Libya and the UAE form a Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) case study. Sweden has ratified the CEDAW and the Optional 
Protocol, while Latvia only ratified the basic CEDAW. Libya has ratified the CEDAW and its 
Optional Protocol, whereas the UAE only ratified the CEDAW. Moreover, Europe and MENA 
were chosen for a regional comparison because of their freedom level, as defined by the Freedom 
House Index, and the amount of treaty reservations used by each region.  
Table 2 portrays the Freedom House ratings for each region. The freedom levels were 
calculated by averaging the freedom levels of each state in a particular region. MENA had the 
lowest average of 29.43 and is classified as not free. Europe averaged a score of 91.14 and has 
the highest rating compared to the other regions. Sweden and Latvia have high freedom ratings, 
whereas Libya and the UAE have low freedom ratings (Table 1). The freedom levels 




demonstrate how a region with high freedom interacts with international law compared to an area 
with low freedom.  
Table 2: Freedom House Index and Classification 
Region Freedom Level Freedom House Classification 
MENA 29.4 Not Free 
Asia 43.4 Partly Free 
Africa 43.9 Partly Free 
South America 71.7 Free 
Europe 91.1 Free 
 
These cases allow for comparisons to be made between states that are from the same 
region and similar culture. For example, Sweden can be compared to Latvia, and Libya can be 
compared to the UAE. Comparisons can also be made between Europe and the MENA. 
Furthermore, states that ratified the Optional Protocol can be compared to the states that have not 
ratified it. The following section discusses each states’ human rights violations, UPR 
recommendations, and domestic policies to protect women’s rights. 
The data collected for each case study was from two nongovernmental organizations: 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The bulk of the data was gathered from the 
United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The UPR publishes reports on the human 
rights practices of UN member states and compiles a list of recommendations the state can 
implement to improve its human rights practices.  
The UPR reviews 48 states every year and is conducted by 47 members of the UN 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (UNHRC 2018). All UN member states are allowed to 




participate in the dialogue and recommendations sections of the review (UNHRC 2018). Three 
UN member states, chosen by random, assist the review process and act as rapporteurs (UNHRC 
2018). These sources document every human right violation for each state. Moreover, the UPR 
resources are used to analyze what recommendations states have accepted and if they have made 
progress in fulfilling and implementing those recommendations.  
States report their progress in human rights in their National Report, a document required 
for the UPR process. The UPR data illustrates if states listen to and obey international law 
institutions. The UPR reviews states every five years. States are suppose to adopt the 
recommendations from the UPR into their domestic politics over that time period. The cases in 
this study all have two UPR cycles. UPR recommendations have been taken from the first cycle, 
while the reports on what the states have done to respond to the recommendations have been 
taken from the second cycle. This makes it possible to observe if the states have adequately 
responded to UPR recommendations in the time after their first cycle.  
Table 3: Sovereignty Reservations for all Regions for 5 Treaties 
Treaty MENA Asia Africa South 
America 
The West 
ICCPR 6 4 4 1 83 
ICESCR 3 2 3 0 13 
CEDAW 41 13 5 3 12 
CRC 9 22 3 3 14 
CAT 17 6 7 1 8 
Total 
Reservations 
76 47 22 8 130 
States per Region 21 31 49 12 41 




Table 3 and Table 4 depict the treaty reservations for each region to five major human 
rights treaties. A reservation is a unilateral declaration made by a state that allows it to ignore 
following a certain treaty article. The treaties are the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, and the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT). These treaties were analyzed because they all have an 
individual petition system that allows citizens to file cases against their state for a right violation. 
The reservations were calculated by counting each treaty article and not sub articles. This was 
done to get a broad overview of how reservations are used in treaties.  
Table 3 portrays sovereignty reservations which are reservations that allude to state 
sovereignty as a justification for rejecting a treaty provision. The West refers to Europe, Canada, 
the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The West used the most sovereignty reservations 
than the other regions. It used 130 total sovereignty reservations with most of them, 83 
reservations, being used in the ICCPR. This demonstrates how the West is concerned with the 
protection of civil and political rights over other rights. MENA had the second highest amount of 
sovereignty reservations with 76 reservations. In contrary to the West, the reservations of MENA 
were primarily in the CEDAW with 41 reservations. This conveys that MENA is concerned with 
women’s rights than other rights. MENA and the West are the two regions that used the most 
sovereignty reservations. South America used the least amount of sovereignty reservations with a 
total of eight reservations. 
 On the other hand, Table 4 displays the culture reservations which cite culture as a 
justification for rejecting a treaty article. MENA issued the highest number of culture 
reservations with 46 reservations. Asia had the second highest with 16, followed by Africa with 
11, the West with three, and finally South America with zero. Similar to its sovereignty 




reservations, a majority of MENA’s reservations are concentrated in the CEDAW with 27 
reservations. The CRC received the second highest amount from MENA with 13 reservations. 
The West used three culture reservations. Two for CEDAW and one for the CRC. This shows 
that MENA has more cultural objections to human rights, in particular women’s rights, than 
other regions.  
Table 4: Culture Reservations for all Regions for 5 Treaties 
Treaty MENA Asia Africa South America The West 
ICCPR 5 0 2 0 0 
ICESCR 1 0 0 0 0 
CEDAW 27 11 5 0 2 
CRC 13 5 4 0 1 
CAT 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
Reservations 
46 16 11 0 3 
States per 
Region 
21 31 49 12 41 
 
 Overall, the West used the most reservations followed by MENA. The great majority of 
the reservations of the West and MENA were sovereignty reservations. Unlike the West, MENA 
also used more cultural reservations.  
States that participate with the UPR system may seem to demonstrate that international 
law affects state behavior. However, this does not account for how sovereignty plays a role in 
state compliance with international law. Treaty reservations and the ratification status of many 
Optional Protocols showcase how states use their sovereignty to avoid complying with 




international law requirements. Similarly, cultural relativism can also prevent states from 
complying with international law standards. By studying the two regions with the most amount 
of reservations, the relationship between international law and the regions that often reject 
international law principles can be examined.  
 
Chapter 2: State Sovereignty 
2.1 Treaty Reservations 
Reservations are a crucial aspect to international law that can illuminate how states reject 
international legal standards. To repeat, reservations allow a state to evade certain articles of a 
human rights treaty. The analysis of reservations is important because it will explain why states 
oppose certain human rights principles. Tables 2 and 3 from earlier can be analyzed. They 
outline the reservations for the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, and the CAT made by each 
region. The West contains all of Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
The reservations came in the form of sovereignty and culture reservations. Sovereignty 
reservations allude to state sovereignty as a justification for noncompliance with a treaty rule, 
and culture reservations cite culture, religion, and tradition as justifications for noncompliance 
with treaty rules.  
The sovereignty reservations are dispersed across multiple treaties. The West used the 
most sovereignty reservations with 130, followed by MENA with 76, Asia with 47, Africa with 
22, and South America with 8. The vast amount of the reservations made by the West were for 
the ICCPR with 83 reservations made just for that treaty. MENA made the most reservations for 
the CEDAW with 41, and Asia made the most for the CRC with 22. It appears that each region 




has its own concern for a specific area of human rights. The West is concerned with civil and 
political rights, MENA with women’s rights, and Asia with children’s rights. Above all, 
sovereignty reservations are a clear tactic used by states to avoid compliance with international 
law standards. 
The culture reservation table illustrates that culture reservations are practiced by certain 
regions and for certain treaties. MENA used the most culture reservations with 44 total. Every 
other region used less than 20. South America used the least with 0 reservations. Moreover, 
culture reservations are concentrated in two treaties, the CEDAW and the CRC. MENA 
submitted the most culture reservations to the CEDAW and the CRC. Asia made the second 
highest amount of culture reservations with 16. It followed a similar pattern as MENA by 
implementing 11 reservations in the CEDAW and 5 in the CRC. Africa made 11 total culture 
reservations with the majority of its reservations being in the CEDAW and the CRC. Finally, the 
West made 3 culture reservations. New Zealand made 2 reservations and Canada made 1 
reservation to protect the customs of their indigenous population. All culture reservations 
referenced Islam and sharia except 3 from the West and 2 from Israel. Culture reservations are 
rare in the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the CAT. It can be suggested that there is less of a cultural 
objection to civil and political rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it 
is apparent that there is a cultural objection to the rights of women and children. The culture 
reservations convey how cultural relativism is a legitimate threat to international law 
compliance.  
Overall, sovereignty is a greater threat to international law compliance than culture. 
Sovereignty reservations are practiced more often than culture reservations. Culture reservations 




are used primarily by MENA. While culture reservations are still used by other regions, they are 
not used to the same extent as MENA. So, culture reservations are practiced by mainly one 
region, whereas sovereignty reservations are practiced and used more by the whole world. 
Nevertheless, the combination of sovereignty and cultural relativism permit states to not comply 
with international legal standards. 
 
2.2 Ratification of General Treaties and Optional Protocols 
 This section studies the ratification data for five major human rights treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC). These treaties were chosen because they all have Optional Protocols, are 
popular, and have strong enforcement mechanisms. Strong enforcement mechanisms are systems 
of enforcement that give power to individuals to hold their state accountable for human rights 
violations. The most popular strong enforcement mechanism is the individual petition system 
which lets individuals sue their states for violating human rights laws. All strong enforcement 
mechanisms are found in the Optional Protocols of treaties. This enforcement mechanism takes 
power away from the state and puts it into the hands of individual citizens. Next, the ratification 
data of these five treaties and their Optional Protocols will be illustrated and compared. States 
that are dark blue have ratified the treaty, states in light blue have signed the treaty, and states in 
orange have taken no action towards the treaty. Ratified states are legally bound to the treaty 




laws, signatory states have acknowledged the treaty, but are not bound to them, and states that 
took no action reject the treaty and not bound to it. By observing the difference in ratification 
behavior between the standard treaty and its Optional Protocol, the significance of state 
sovereignty in international law is revealed.  
The image below is the ratification status of the standard ICCPR. Clearly, a vast majority 
of the world has ratified it. On the contrary, the following image depicts the ratifications of the 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Notice the drop off in ratifications. There are 171 
ratification for the ICCPR, but 116 ratifications for the First Optional Protocol (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner 2018a). Major liberal democracies have taken no action on the First 
Optional Protocol either such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Switzerland 
(UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). Therefore, states are reluctant to ratify treaties 
that suspend their sovereignty. 
Image 1: Ratification Status of the ICCPR 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of ICCPR ratifications]. United Nations High 












Image 2: Ratification Status of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 ratifications]. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
The ratification status continues to evaporate for the Second Optional Protocol. There are 
85 ratifications of the Second Optional Protocol and 110 states that took no action (UN Office of 
the High Commissioner 2018a). The Second Optional Protocol combines human rights content 
with a strict enforcement mechanism. The Second Optional Protocol revolves around the death 
penalty and states under Article 1 that “​No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the 
present Protocol shall be executed” (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018b). The 
difference between the First and Second Optional Protocols is that the First Protocol just 
establishes the individual petition system. The Second Optional Protocol would extend the same 
enforcement mechanism from the First Protocol and bind states to outlawing executions. The 
contrast in ratifications between the basic treaty and the Optional Protocols sheds light on the 
fact that the state sovereignty drives states away from complying with international law 








Image 3: Ratification Status of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 ratifications]. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
 
The ICESCR has 169 ratifications, 4 signatures, and 24 states took no action (UN Office 
of the High Commissioner 2018a). Predictably, its Optional Protocol has 24 ratifications, 25 
signatures, and 149 states took no action (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). Again, 
this demonstrates how states act according to their sovereignty and avoid ratifying treaties that 
would diminish state power.  
Image 4: Ratification Status of the ICESCR 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of ICESCR ratifications]. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
 




Image 5: Ratification Status of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of ICESCR Optional Protocol 1 ratifications]. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
 
A dramatic third case is the CRC. The CRC is the most widely accepted human rights 
treaty. It has 196 ratifications and 1 signatory (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). 
There are three Optional Protocols to the CRC. The third establishes the individual petition 
system (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a) found in the ICESCR and the ICCPR. 
What is utterly shocking is how many ratifications are lost on the third protocol cementing an 
individual petition system. The third protocol has 39 ratifications with 139 states taking no action 
(UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). This example augments the argument that states 
are less likely to ratify treaties that challenge their sovereignty. This case goes from having 196 
ratifications to 39 when more effective monitoring forces are applied. The fact that the most 
popular human rights treaty around the world can lose nearly all of its supporters greatly displays 








Image 6: Ratification Status of the CRC 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CRC ratifications]. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org. 
 
Image 7: Ratification Status of the Third Optional Protocol to the CRC 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CRC Optional Protocol 3 ratifications]. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
Furthermore, the CEDAW and the CAT follow the same pattern as the previous human 
rights treaties. The CEDAW is a very popular treaty boasting 189 ratifications, 2 signatories, and 
6 states with no action (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). The CAT is also well 
recognized with 164 ratifications, 7 signatories, and 26 states with no action (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner 2018a).  
 




Image 8: Ratification Status of the CEDAW 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CEDAW ratifications]. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org. 
 
Image 9: Ratification Status of the CAT 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CAT ratifications]. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Retrieved from ​http://indicators.ohchr.org​. 
 
 Like the other cases, the number of ratifications drops off for the Optional Protocols. The 
ratifications for the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW is 109, alongside 13 signatories and 75 
states that took no action (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). Likewise, the Optional 
Protocol to the CAT has 88 ratifications, 14 signatories, and 95 states that took action (UN 
Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). The Optional Protocol to the CEDAW creates the 
individual petition system that has been used in the other treaties, and the Optional Protocol to 
the CAT enacts a subcommittee to regularly visit states to monitor the conditions of detainees 




and the detainment practices of the state (UN Office of the High Commissioner 2018a). This is a 
strong enforcement mechanism because its power is placed in an intergovernmental organization 
rather than the state. 
Image 10: Ratification Status of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CEDAW Optional Protocol 1 ratifications]. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org. 
 
Image 11: Ratification Status of the Optional Protocol to the CAT 
 
United Nations. 2018.[Map illustration of CEDAW Optional Protocol 1 ratifications]. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org 
 
To summarize, this empirical evidence proves that states are unlikely to comply with 
international law standards that threaten their state sovereignty. States are more likely to ratify 
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms than treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms. 
Weak enforcement mechanisms are found in each standard treaty studied, while the strict 




enforcement mechanisms are located in the Optional Protocols. The unwillingness for states to 
be bound by a strong enforcement mechanism reveals that states do not want to be held 
accountable for their human rights violations and policies. This illustrates that states care more 
about their own sovereignty than individual human rights and compliance with international law. 
Treaty reservations are another subject that demonstrates how states prioritize their own 
sovereignty over treaty laws. 
 
Chapter 3: Case Studies 
3.1 Sweden 
Sweden is ratified to the CEDAW and its Optional Protocol. It has a perfect Freedom House 
Index of 100 out of 100. Sweden highlights how a state that is ratified to a general convention 
and a specific protocol is influenced by international law. Also, the high freedom level of 
Sweden portrays how a state with high freedom is affected by international law. 
 
3.1.1 Rights Abuses 
Sweden experienced many cases of sexual violence against women. Amnesty International 
(2018) in its annual human rights report stated that rape was a common abuse against women and 
that “The number of rapes reported to the police increased by 14% during the first half of the 
year compared with the same period in 2016 (from 2,999 to 3,430)”. Also, only 111 cases made 
it to court (Amnesty International 2018).  
The majority of concerns from the United Nations (UN) and Sweden’s own domestic 
concerns were about domestic violence and the gender wage gap. The United Nations Human 




Rights Council (UNHRC) reported that “each year 13 to 20 women died at the hand of a partner” 
(UNHRC 2014a, 5). Sweden noted in its UPR National Report that, “While the total pay gap 
between women and men had decreased by 3 percentage points between 1994 and 2013, there 
was still a pay gap in Sweden of around 13 per cent” (UNHRC 2015a, 4). However, the UN 
“observed that the wage gap between women and men had essentially remained constant for 30 
years and the labour market was markedly segregated” (UNHRC 2014a, 3).  
 
3.1.2 Universal Periodic Review Recommendations 
Next, UPR recommendations can be studied to see if the international community is responding 
effectively and accurately to these rights abuses. The first UPR cycle for Sweden occured in 
2010. Sweden accepted 106 UPR recommendations out of 149 (UNHRC 2010a, 12-23). Sixteen 
of the accepted recommendations were about women’s rights. Many of the recommendations 
were about domestic violence, some were about ending the gender wage gap, and the rest were 
about giving women more representation in decision making in Swedish society. 
 
3.1.2.1 Recommendations on Domestic Violence 
Sweden was recommended to increase funding for programs that prevent violence against 
women (Greece), to continue to fund programs that prevent violence against women and create 
more shelters for affected women (Portugal), and to improve its efforts at fighting violence 
against women in accordance with international human rights standards (Netherlands) (UNHRC 
2010a, 16). Also, Sweden was recommended to “Intensify its efforts to eliminate violence 
against women and to develop a national plan of action” (Iran) (UNHRC 2010a, 16), to 




“Intensify measures to avoid discrimination against women and to combat violence against 
them” (Chile) (UNHRC 2010a, 16), and to “Continue to implement its effective measures to 
prevent discrimination against women and to combat violence against them” (Botswana) 
(UNHRC 2010a, 16).  
 
3.1.2.2 Recommendations on the Gender Wage Gap 
Other recommendations dealt with the gender wage gap. Sweden was recommended to 
“Continue taking efficient measures with a view to decreasing and eventually eliminating the 
wage gap between men and women” (Slovenia) (UNHRC 2010a, 16), to “Take concrete actions 
to reduce the gender gap in decision-making positions as well as to ensure equal remuneration 
for men and women” (Pakistan) (UNHRC 2010a, 21), and to “Continue to move forward in its 
efforts to achieve full equality in remuneration between men and women” (Colombia) (UNHRC 
2010a, 14).  
 
3.1.2.3 Recommendations on Women’s Representation in Decisionmaking 
A minority of the recommendations suggest that Sweden give women the opportunities to be in 
important decisionmaking roles. Sweden was suggested to “Continue to make efforts to 
guarantee equality between men and women so that women may play important roles in the 
decision-making processes of public institutions” (Nicaragua) (UNHRC 2010a, 14) and to “Give 
the female population the opportunity to achieve high-level positions with important 
decision-making levels” (Iraq) (UNHRC 2010a, 16).  
 




3.1.3 Domestic Responses to the International Community 
Sweden has adopted many policies to address the recommendations of the UPR through 
increased government spending on programs to end domestic violence and new laws to help 
women succeed in the economy. Like the UPR recommendations, Sweden’s active policy 
measures have been geared towards fighting domestic violence and the gender wage gap. The 
actions Sweden took to combat domestic violence was mixed between improving the police, 
raising awareness and funding research projects, and building and sustaining shelters for women 
affected by violence. With the police force, a special inspection group was assigned in 2013 to 
review the use of lethal force in relationships and research if there are additional ways for the 
police to prevent violence against women (UNHRC 2014b, 11). Additionally, the police have 
spread information on domestic violence and encouraged victims to report their case to the police 
(UNHRC 2014b, 11). The government noted that special attention was given to honor-related 
acts of violence and improved the awareness of local schools to the issue of domestic violence 
(UNHRC 2014b, 11). For shelters, the government has developed a method to evaluate the 
effectiveness of its shelters and reported that each municipality could provide shelter, advice, and 
support for victims of domestic violence (UNHRC 2014b, 11).  
The Government continues to fund research and awareness campaigns about domestic 
violence. Sweden funds non-profit organizations that work to end domestic violence. The 
government stated that it spent $2,545,295 to non-profit groups fighting domestic violence 
(UNHRC 2014b, 11). In addition, $12,062,485 is spent each year on bolstering the services of 
each municipality which assist women, children, and facilitators of domestic violence (UNHRC 
2014b, 11). Currently, Sweden is working on a national strategy for eliminating domestic 




violence and the final report was completed on May 29th, 2015 (UNHRC 2014b, 11). Also, 
$4,647,930 was spent on multiple projects researching domestic violence and forms of sexual 
violence (UNHRC 2014b, 11). Similarly, a national coordinator was responsible for researching 
domestic violence from 2012-2014. (UNHRC 2014b, 11). The report of the coordinator 
contained 50 suggestions to the government which are being reviewed (UNHRC 2014b, 11). The 
government declared that it spent a total of about $110,665,000 on its programs to end domestic 
violence from 2010-2014 (UNHRC 2014b, 10). Sweden proclaims that its spending has helped 
municipalities and agencies conduct better work around domestic violence, strengthened the 
cooperation between agencies, and has “helped to improve skills in the public sector, both in 
agencies and in individual employees” (UNHRC 2014b, 10). Finally, Sweden has ratified new 
human rights treaties. Sweden ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) and 
“introduced new legislation that strengthened the protection against forced marriage and child 
marriage” (UNHRC 2015a, 4).  
Sweden was very active in taking measures to improve women’s conditions in the 
economy. Many of the policies work to remove the wage gap and increase the amount of women 
in leading business and entrepreneurial roles. A government delegation is researching ways to 
promote gender equality and remove the wage gap (UNHRC 2014b, 10). Wage surveys will be 
given each year to track the progress of removing the wage gap (UNHRC 2014b, 10). 
Furthermore, the Discrimination Act of 2008 bans any kind of wage discrimination based on 
gender (UNHRC 2014b, 10). In fact, employers are required to promote equal rights in the 
workplace (UNHRC 2014b, 10). The Equality Ombudsman monitors the efforts of employers to 




achieve equal rights in the workplace, and it will bolster its task of monitoring pay rates 
(UNHRC 2014b, 10). The Equality Ombudsman will be issuing a report of its findings during its 
increased surveillance of pay rates on March 1st, 2015 (UNHRC 2014b, 10). Finally, the 
government created  “the Delegation for Gender Equality in Working Life to investigate the 
different conditions for women and men and to propose actions to promote gender equality and 
reduce the pay gap” (UNHRC 2015a, 4). In addition to ending the wage gap, Sweden hopes to 
increase the number of women on the boards of companies. Sweden stated that “If the proportion 
of women on the governing boards of listed companies is not at least 40 per cent by 2016, a 
legislative proposal on quotas will be presented” (UNHRC 2014b, 9-10). The government 
intends to boost the number of female entrepreneurs through the Golden Rules of Leadership 
program between 2013 and 2014 (UNHRC 2014b, 9-10). Indeed, Sweden spent $11,066,500 on 
a program to increase businesses run by women (UNHRC 2014b, 9-10). Sweden recorded that 
the number of businesses ran by women increased by 13.2% between 2006 and 2010 (UNHRC 
2014b, 9-10).  
Besides domestic violence and economic rights, Sweden has seen growth in the 
representation of women since the 1990’s. Sweden asserted that “One area in which there has 
been marked favourable development since the 1990s is the distribution of power and influence 
in politically elected assemblies, as a result of several Riksdag parties’ active work to boost 
women’s representation” (UNHRC 2014b, 9). Specifically, the members of government 
agencies’ boards are 48% women and 52% men, and the agency chairs were composed of 41% 
women and 59% men (UNHRC 2014b, 9).  
 





After reviewing the recommendations from the UPR and observing the policies Sweden has 
implemented to secure women’s rights, Sweden complied with international law and the UPR. 
Most of the recommendations were concerned with violence against women and the wage gap, 
and most of the actions taken by Sweden dealt with combating violence against women and 
ending the wage gap. Fixing these two issues can be difficult because they are more forms of de 
facto discrimination than de jure discrimination, meaning the adoption of a norm or change of a 
law will not necessarily bring an end to either problem. Still, the government is actively involved 
in solving these issues and has put a great amount of money towards research and raising 
awareness of domestic violence. Government monitoring of wages, legal and normative pressure 
on employers, programs that support entrepreneurship, and annual surveys can all help Sweden 
eliminate the wage gap and increase the representation of women in the economy. Ultimately, 
Sweden has responded to many of the UPR’s recommendations with active government policies.  
The recommendations to combat violence against women were fulfilled. 
Recommendations to increase funding for domestic violence programs and to add more shelters 
for victims of abuse were successful. Sweden is able to maintain shelters in all of its 
municipalities and spent $111 million on programs to end violence against women. In addition, 
Sweden satisfied the recommendations for the gender wage gap. Recommendations that 
suggested to continue to reduce the gender wage gap were fulfilled through wage monitoring, the 
Delegation for Gender Equality in Working Life, and Golden Rules of Leadership Program. 
Lastly, Sweden did not create new policies to increase women’s representation in 




decisionmaking positions primarily because Sweden already has a large proportion of women 
that serve in the government. 
 
3.2 Latvia 
Latvia is ratified to the CEDAW and not the Optional Protocol. Latvia has a high Human 
Freedom Index of 87 out of 100. Latvia demonstrates how a state with high freedom that has 
ratified only a general convention is influenced by international law. 
 
3.2.1​ ​Rights Abuses 
Like Sweden, Latvia has been criticized for the wage gap between men and women and domestic 
violence. The United Nations noted that “The Human Rights Committee was concerned at the 
persisting wage gap between men and women in the private sector and the high unemployment 
rate of women” (UNHRC 2015b, 10). With domestic violence, the Council of Europe (CoE) 
“found in relation to Latvia that measures implemented to address the problem of domestic 
violence had not been sufficient” (UNHRC 2015c, 6). Furthermore, Latvia is a hotspot for 
human trafficking. “The Human Rights Committee was concerned that Latvia remained a 
country of origin for trafficking in human beings for sexual and labour exploitation, particularly 
of young women” (UNHRC 2015b, 7). In addition, the CoE “found in relation to Latvia that 
insufficient efforts had been undertaken to reduce the prevailing high maternal mortality rate” 
(UNHRC 2015c, 8). Lastly, Muslim women have faced discrimination with a potential bill that 
would ban the wearing of a full face veil. Amnesty International (2018) reports that “In August, 
the government put forward draft legislation which effectively prohibits wearing the full-face 




veil in public. The Justice Ministry argued that the measure would protect people’s welfare and 
morality, and facilitate the integration of immigrants.”  
 
3.2.2 Universal Periodic Review Recommendations 
Latvia accepted 71 out of 122 recommendations (UNHRC 2016a, 2). Fourteen were about 
women’s rights. Many recommendations focused on domestic violence and protecting the 
general equality of women. In addition, other recommendations brought attention to human 
trafficking. 
 
3.2.2.1 Recommendations on Domestic Violence 
Latvia was suggested to “Establish a comprehensive plan on gender equality, especially stressing 
prosecution of sexual exploitation and prevention of gender violence” (Spain) (UNHRC 2011a, 
14), to “Intensify its efforts to prevent, punish and eliminate all forms of violence against 
women” (Argentina) (UNHRC 2011a, 14), and to “Further continue its efforts to combat 
domestic violence, including through raising public awareness” (Azerbaijan) (UNHRC 2011a, 
14). Moreover, Latvia received recommendations to “Provide specific training to law 
enforcement staff to enable them to better understand and prevent domestic violence” (Hungary) 
(UNHRC 2011a, 14), to “Strengthen its criminal legislation on domestic violence to notably 
make sure that such violence is considered as an aggravating circumstance” (France) (UNHRC 
2011a, 16), and to “Adopt the necessary legislative measures in the Criminal Code to define 
domestic violence and criminalize marital rape as a specific crime” (Mexico) (UNHRC 2011a, 
16).  




3.2.2.2 Recommendations on Women’s Equality 
Some recommendations encouraged Latvia to maintain equality between men and women. 
Latvia was asserted to “Continue to strengthen the national mechanism on gender equality, as 
recommended by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women” (Chile) 
(UNHRC 2011a, 14), to “Continue efforts to advance gender equality and continue tackling the 
gender equality issues indicated in the national report” (Lithuania) (UNHRC 2011a, 14), and to 
“Further adopt and implement policies and legislation to combat gender discrimination and to 
promote the empowerment of women, including equal job opportunities and equal remuneration 
for work of equal value” (Brazil) (UNHRC 2011a, 14).  
On the contrary, Latvia declined two recommendations about women’s equality. Latvia 
rejected a resolution to “Adopt a comprehensive gender equality law” (Poland) (UNHRC 2011a, 
19) and a recommendation to “Promote the inclusion in the Constitution and national legislation 
of the definition of discrimination against women, as well as the principle of equality between 
men and women” (Mexico) (UNHRC 2011a, 19). Latvia declined these two recommendations 
because it “has chosen a different approach – to integrate anti-discriminatory provisions into 
sectoral laws. Such approach is consistent with the Latvian legal tradition and is no less effective 
than the comprehensive law approach” (UNHRC 2011b, 3).  
 
3.2.2.3 Recommendations on Human Rights Law and Human Trafficking 
The remaining recommendations were about human trafficking and participating in international 
law. Latvia was urged to “Consider the possibility of ratifying the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (Argentina) 




(UNHRC 2011a, 13) and to “Continue efforts to improve and protect the rights of women and 
children by implementing recommendations made by the United Nations mechanisms and its 
related special procedures” (Palestine) (UNHRC 2011a, 13). Two human trafficking 
recommendations were accepted by Latvia. It accepted to “Pursue its efforts to combat 
trafficking in human beings, especially women and children” (Algeria) (UNHRC 2011a, 15) and 
to “Prioritize training for the judiciary and the police on how to treat victims of trafficking as 
well as domestic violence” (Norway) (UNHRC 2011a, 15).  
 
3.2.3 Domestic Responses to the International Community 
Latvia has passed many new policies that protect women’s economic rights and that fight 
domestic violence. To start, Latvia criminalized marital rape thanks to amendments to its 
Criminal Law (CL) in 2014 (UNHRC 2016b, 17). Latvia has made it easier for victims of 
domestic violence to end their marriage. The new law holds that if the couple has lived 
separately for less than three years, then “the marriage may be dissolved by a court if the reason 
for breaking down of a marriage is physical, sexual, psychological or economical violation of the 
spouse against the other spouse” (UNHRC 2016b, 17). Also, Latvia introduced the Concept of 
Preventive Coercive Measures in 2013 which “aims to achieve a long-term reduction of number 
and recurrence level of violence cases, including domestic violence-related offences” (UNHRC 
2016b, 17). The State Family Policy Guidelines (2011-2017) and its Action Plan (2012-2014) list 
goals to make towards ending domestic violence (UNHRC 2016b, 17). The Cabinet of Ministers 
(CM) approved of measures to develop social rehabilitation centers for victims of domestic 
violence in 2014 (UNHRC 2016b, 17-18). Social rehabilitation centers will provide lawyers, 




psychologists, and social workers to assist victims and perpetrators (UNHRC 2016b, 17-18). In 
addition, Latvia noted that “On 31 March 2014, complex amendments to legal acts introducing 
temporary protection against violence entered into force” (UNHRC 2016b, 2) which allows it “to 
improve legal framework in order to join the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) (UNHRC 
2016b, 2). In fact, Latvia plans on ratifying the convention by the end of 2018 (Amnesty 
International 2018).  
Similarly, Latvia has taken a lot of responsibility in securing women’s economic rights. 
Latvia created the “Gender Equality in Economic Decision Making – Tool to Promote Economic 
Competitiveness and Equality Value” in 2013 (UNHRC 2016b, 16). This program was a public 
awareness campaign that “highlighted the principles of equality with regard to equal pay, choice 
of profession, and career prospects” (UNHRC 2016b, 16). Moreover, Latvia has ran its 
Mentoring Program since 2009 which promotes women’s entrepreneurship (UNHRC 2016b, 16). 
To address workplace segregation based on gender, Latvia adopted the Guidelines on Inclusive 
Employment in 2015 (UNHRC 2016b, 16). This policy “addresses the labour market segregation 
and the lack of balanced representation of women and men in different sectors of the labour 
market that has an impact on the formation of the pay gap” (UNHRC 2016b, 16). In 2012, Latvia 
drafted the Gender Equality Actions Plan (UNHRC 2016b, 16). This plan hopes to achieve the 
“elimination of gender roles and stereotypes, promotion of healthy and environment-friendly 
lifestyle for women and men, promotion of economic independence and equal opportunities in 
the labour market for women and men, and monitoring and evaluation of gender equality policy” 
(UNHRC 2016b, 16).  




The state has made notable progress in women’s rights. Latvia highlighted that it was 
ranked among the top twenty states in securing gender equality according to the Global Gender 
Gap Report (UNHRC 2015b, 4). The same report indicated that Latvia “had fully closed the 
gender gap in the fields of health and survival as well as education attainment” (UNHRC 2015b, 
4). Additionally, one third of all enterprises in Latvia are owned by women (UNHRC 2016b, 2). 
Latvia maintains that “31.44% of all positions in company boards and councils were held by 
women” (UNHRC 2016b, 2) and that “31% of companies listed on the stock exchange were 
managed by women, which is the second highest indicator in the European Union” (UNHRC 
2016b, 2).  
Finally, Latvia has made changes to address human trafficking, the maternal mortality 
rate, and to strengthen family relations. Latvia is aiding victims of human trafficking by 
“building the capacity of law enforcement agencies in this field and increased State-funded 
support for victims, compensation and rehabilitation” (UNHRC 2016b, 4). For maternal 
mortality, Latvia has adopted the Maternal and Child Health Improvement Plan in 2012 
(UNHRC 2016b, 3). To add, Latvia has seen an increase in paternity leaves. Paternity leaves 
have increased from 22% in 2004 to 45% in 2014 (UNHRC 2016b, 16). Latvia contends that 
“Measures have been implemented to promote the reconciliation of work and family, informative 
and educational activities, improvement of child care services, and the introduction of flexible 









Latvia faced similar threats to women’ rights as Sweden. Domestic violence and women’s 
economic rights were observed in Latvian society, and the state took measures to eliminate these 
abuses. Latvia criminalized marital rape and made violence against women an aggravating crime, 
a response to two recommendations. Furthermore, the state introduced new policies like the 
Gender Equality Action Plan in 2012, the Maternal and Child Health Improvement Plan, and the 
Guidelines on Inclusive Employment in 2015. Latvia accepted the majority of its 
recommendations and made it clear that 17 recommendations were already implemented or were 
in the process of implementation during its first cycle (UNHRC 2011a, 16-17). Two of these 
recommendations were about women’s rights. Latvia accepted and implemented its 
recommendations despite only being ratified to the CEDAW. Ratification to the Optional 
Protocol appears to have no impact on compliance with international law in the case of Latvia. 
Also, Latvia’s high freedom level and status as a European state may explain its compliance with 
international law. 
Latvia fulfilled recommendations that advocated to pass measures to prevent domestic 
violence. Latvia did this by passing the Concept on Preventive Coercive Measures, State Family 
Policy Guidelines, and the Action Plan (2012-2014). Also, Latvia addressed recommendations 
which stated to advance gender equality, end the gender wage gap, and get women involved in 
more sectors of the economy. Latvia implemented the Gender Equality in Decisionmaking, 
Guidelines on Inclusive Employment, and the Gender Equality Actions Plan to help women get 
involved in the economy and eliminate the gender wage gap. Finally, Latvia responded to 
recommendations on human trafficking by training the police to better handle human trafficking, 




and by giving trafficking victims assistance in the forms of compensation and rehabilitation. In 
summary, Latvia followed the recommendations of international law by adopting new legislation 
in its domestic affairs.  
 
3.3 Libya 
Libya is the first case study of the MENA group. Libya is ratified to the CEDAW and the 
Optional Protocol. Libya has a low freedom level score of 9 out of 100 on the Freedom House 
Index. Libya displays how a MENA state that is ratified to a general convention and a strict 
protocol interacts with international law. In addition, Libya illustrates how a state with low 
freedom engages with international law.  
 
3.3.1 Rights Abuses 
The rights abuses in Libya were composed of violence against women, violation of marriage 
equality laws, and denied the right to pass down their nationality to their kids or husband. On a 
smaller scale, the representation of women in government and various forms of discrimination 
were of concern. For violations of rights in marriage, Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that 
“​Personal status laws continue to discriminate against women, particularly with respect to 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance” and that “The penal code prohibits all sexual acts outside 
marriage, including same-sex relations, and punishes them with up to five years in prison.” A 
law requiring that the husband obtain consent from his wife to marry a second wife was 
overturned in the Libyan Supreme Court citing that it was incompatible with Islamic law 
(​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4). Also, the Grand Mufti allegedly introduced a law that would prohibit 




Libyan women from marrying foreign men (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4).​ Furthermore, the Penal Code 
allowed for a husband to receive a reduced prison sentence if he killed his wife, sister, daughter, 
or mother who he suspected of having an extramarital affair (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6). The adultery 
law, Law No. 70/1973, criminalized extramarital sexual relations without accounting for forced 
sex (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6). This law has been used to prosecute women who were raped or sexually 
assaulted (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6).  
More rights violations with marriage had to do with nationality laws. Women are not 
allowed to pass their Libyan nationality to their foreign husbands or children (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 
6). The UN recommended that “Libya ensure that mothers were able to pass their nationality to 
their children, regardless of the status or nationality of the child’s father” (​UNHRC​ 2015e, 6). 
Moreover, the UN was concerned about Law No. 24/2010, Libya’s primary nationality law, 
suggesting that it: 
 ​remained ambiguous with respect to the ability of women to confer their nationality on 
their children if their husbands were non-nationals. Libyan men, by contrast, were able to 
confer their nationality on their children irrespective of the nationality of their wives. 
(​UNHRC​ 2015d, 3) 
 
Violence against women is another major violation of women’s rights in Libya. Amnesty 
International (2018) noted that women’s activists and political candidates are threatened for 
expressing their views and often retreat from the public spotlight. A specific incident concerned 
Salwa Bugaighis, a women’s rights activist, who was killed by a group of gunmen (​UNHRC 
2015d, 4). Also, Libyan law does not criminalize forms of domestic violence (Human Rights 
Watch 2018). Likewise, the reduced sentencing for husbands who kill their wives, daughters, or 
mother discussed above further illustrates issues of violence against women. More so, rapists can 




evade prosecution if they marry their victim according to Article 424 of the Penal Code (Human 
Rights Watch 2018) and rape was used as a tactic in war (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 5). Moreover, sexual 
violence was prevalent in many communities, sexual torture was used against detainees to obtain 
information (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 8), and refugees experienced seuxal violence (Amnesty 
International 2018). Similarly, marital rape is not a crime in Libya (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6). Law No. 
10/1984, legislation that defined the rights of men and women in marriage (Refugee 
Documentation Centre 2015), failed to explicitly criminalize domestic violence and marital rape, 
lacked enforcement, and did not provide any services to abuse victims (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6). The 
Grand Mufti received criticism from issuing a fatwa that was “against the agreed conclusions of 
the UN Commission on the Status of Women on the elimination and prevention of all forms of 
violence against women and girls, on the grounds that they were incompatible with Sharia law” 
(​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4). Finally, women were held in social rehabilitation centers for being 
suspected of “transgressions of moral codes” (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 6), but have not broken any 
crimes, already served time, or were rape victims abandoned by their families (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 
6).  
Women have also experienced violations affecting their representation in government. 
For one thing, “The High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Country 
Team noted growing threats and attacks against women activists, which had contributed to 
women’s reluctance to run for election” (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 11). The National Transitional 
Council, which briefly governed Libya after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, had 2 total women on 
a 40 member council and was only allowed 17% of the seats to be held by women (​UNHRC 
2015d, 9). In a similar case, 600 women ran for election to the General National Congress 




(GNC) where 33 women were elected, yet only 2 of those women ended up serving in the GNC 
(​UNHRC​ 2015d, 9). Additionally, only 6 women served on the Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly in 2014 (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 9). This was a 10% quota which fell short of international 
standards set by the Beijing Declaration (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 9). Lastly, Law No. 10/2014, a law 
governing the election rules of Libya, created a 16% quota for women’s representation in the 
House of Representatives on the GNC, but because of violent disruptions of the election polls, 30 
women were elected instead of 32 and the quota was not reached (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 9).  
The last violations in Libya were about general discrimination towards women. Decree 
No. 6 of 2017 prohibited women from traveling abroad without a male chaperone (Amnesty 
International 2018; Human Rights Watch 2018). The law was later repealed and replaced with a 
new law that required men and women to gain a security approval before traveling abroad 
(Amnesty International 2018; Human Rights Watch 2018). Women from Sub Saharan Africa 
who were not accompanied by males were accused of being prostitutes and were detained while 
giving birth at government hospitals (​UNHRC​ 2015e, 6). Also, the Grand Mufti suggested that 
men and women be segregated at universities and offices because a mixed environment created 
“unethical behavior” (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4). In addition, women had trouble reaching educational 
facilities due to poor public transportation and having to travel with a male guardian (​UNHRC 
2015d, 9). Finally, Law No. 58/1970 restricted women to only working in fields associated with 
their gender like education, healthcare, and services (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4). These jobs are low 
paying which contributes to the wage gap between men and women (​UNHRC​ 2015d, 4). 
 
 




3.3.2 Universal Periodic Review Recommendations 
Libya fully accepted 115 out of 120 recommendations (UNHRC 2015f, 2). 14 accepted 
recommendations were about women’s rights. The recommendations given to Libya were mostly 
about empowering women in society, violence against women, and economic rights.  
 
3.3.2.1 Recommendations on Equality 
Libya was proposed to “Explore the possibility of adopting a national strategy to combat 
discrimination against women” (Malaysia) (UNHRC 2011c, 16) and to “Continue to take 
practical measures to ensure the effective participation of women in economic, social and 
political fields” (Pakistan) (UNHRC 2011c, 16). Furthermore, it was recommended to “Continue 
to scale up its efforts to empower women, mainly rural women” (North Korea) (UNHRC 2011c, 
16), to “Continue the measures to promote women rights, including the advancement of 
women’s empowerment” (Azerbaijan) (UNHRC 2011c, 16), and to “Continue the 
implementation of measures designed to enhance the role of women in social and political life” 
(Belarus) (UNHRC 2011c, 16). In addition, Libya was noted to “Step up efforts to enhance the 
participation of women in all spheres of socio-economic life, in line with the progress made in 
education” (Bangladesh) (UNHRC 2011c, 16), to “Strengthen measures and policies to promote 
the active role and participation of women in the political, social and economic life of the 
country” (Vietnam) (UNHRC 2011c, 16), and to “Continue to improve policies and programmes 
to advance the status of women and girls, and to protect children” (Myanmar) (UNHRC 2011c, 
16).  
 





3.3.2.2 Recommendations on Violence Against Women 
Other recommendations focussed on violence against women. Recommendations proclaimed to 
“Adopt policies and legislation aimed at promoting women’s rights and combating gender-based 
discrimination, particularly domestic violence” (Brazil) (UNHRC 2011c, 16), to “Continue its 
efforts to promote women’s role in social and public life, and protect them from violence” (Iran) 
(UNHRC 2011c, 16), and to “Take comprehensive measures to eliminate violence against 
women and children, in particular by adopting a national strategy to combat violence against 
women, as recommended by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women” (Thailand) (UNHRC 2011c, 16).  
 
3.3.2.3 Recommendations on Work and Economic Rights 
The last recommendations were about work. Libya was urged to “Continue its special efforts to 
empower women in various areas, in particular in the labour market” (Egypt) (UNHRC 2011c, 
16) and to “Continue its efforts to increase job opportunities for educated women in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya” (Sudan) (UNHRC 2011c, 16).  
 
3.3.2.4 Declined Recommendations 
Libya declined 1 recommendation about women’s rights. Libya declined Recommendation 96.7 
which recommended to: 
Ensure equality, under the law and in practice, of women, and amend all discriminatory  
legal provisions concerning marriage (including polygamy), male guardianship, child  
custody, divorce and inheritance, as recommended by the Committee on the Elimination  
of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.  




(UNHRC 2011c, 21) 
This declined recommendation displays how Libya is hostile to any change in the domestic 
relationship between husband and wife. This example illustrates how cultural practices can lead 
to noncompliance with international legal requirements. 
 
3.3.3 Domestic Responses to the International Community 
While Libya has accepted an extreme majority of its recommendations, the state had a hard time 
implementing the recommendations because of the revolution to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. 
Libya explained that “The year 2011 saw the outbreak of the 17 February revolution, which 
responded to the legitimate aspiration of the Libyan people to free itself from the oppressive 
measures that had been enacted by the former regime” (UNHRC 2015f, 2). Also, Libya noted 
that because of the revolution, “it has not been possible to implement some of the 
recommendations” (UNHRC 2015f, 2). In fact, there were only minor developments in the 
national legislation of the state that responded to the recommendations. The Council of Ministers 
established a committee to research sexual violence and determine reparations to be given to 
victims (UNHRC 2015e, 8-9). However, the committee lacked enforcement and adequate health 
care services (UNHRC 2015e, 8-9). It was also observed that “​In some instances of rape, women 
had been accused of adultery or encouraged to marry the perpetrator to protect their honour” 
(UNHRC 2015e, 8-9). To add, the Minister of Justice issued a ministerial decree that protected 
victims of sexual violence (UNHRC 2015d, 5-6). The law focused on giving victims cash 
reparations and gave assistance to victims to sue the perpetrator in court (UNHRC 2015d, 5-6). 
Nevertheless, the bill has not officially passed into law (UNHRC 2015d, 5-6). Indeed, the 




Council of Ministers passed a law that classified rape victims of the revolution as war victims 
(UNHRC 2015f, 8). This allowed women to receive medical and psychological care, financial 
assistance, and assistance in suing perpetrators (UNHRC 2015f, 8). Lastly, Libya has ratified the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (​UNHRC 
2015f, 7). However, it is uncertain if a recommendation caused this. The treaty was not 
mentioned specifically, but Libya was recommended to “​Accede to international human rights 
conventions not yet acceded to” (UNHRC 2011c, 18). Still, this recommendation is too broad to 
determine a causal relationship. 
The UN was critical of Libya’s domestic responses to protect women’s rights. It 
highlighted that “Libya had failed to address discriminatory laws that encouraged violence 
against women despite Recommendation 93.36 enjoying support” (UNHRC 2015d, 6). 
Recommendation 93.36 was made by Thailand and recommends to “Take comprehensive 
measures to eliminate violence against women and children, in particular by adopting a national 
strategy to combat violence against women, as recommended by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women” (UNHRC 2011c, 16). Also, the UN maintained 
that no changes have been made to fulfill other recommendations (UNHRC 2015d, 3). 
Specifically, the UN noted that no changes were made in regard to Recommendation 93.20, 
93.26, and 93.33 (UNHRC 2015d, 3). Recommendation 93.20 was made by Brazil which states 
to “Adopt policies and legislation aimed at promoting women’s rights and combating 
gender-based discrimination, particularly domestic violence” (UNHRC 2011c, 16), 
Recommendation 93.26 was issued by Vietnam which pronounces to “Strengthen measures and 
policies to promote the active role and participation of women in the political, social and 




economic life of the country” (UNHRC 2011c, 16), and 93.33 by Pakistan advising to “Continue 
to take practical measures to ensure the effective participation of women in economic, social and 
political fields” (UNHRC 2011c, 16)​. 
 
3.3.4 Summary 
Libya responded positively at first to working with international law by accepting 115 of 120 
recommendations. Yet, as has been discussed, Libya had trouble creating policies to implement 
these recommendations. One vital reason that explains why Libya had trouble creating new laws 
is that the country is experiencing intrastate violence from non-state actors and political 
instability in the aftermath of the revolution. This may have hindered the ability for Libya to 
effectively materialize the recommendations into laws. In spite of its lack of new policies, Libya 
achieved success in women’s education. Libya announced that “​Libyan women are some of the 
most educated in the Arab world. More than half of all graduates in Libya are women, according 
to the United Nations Development Programme (UNHRC 2015f, 8). The case of Libya displayed 
that a MENA state with low freedom was unable to effectively respond to international law, and 
that international law failed to change Libya’s behavior. Also, the ratification to the Optional 
Protocol did not affect Libya’s compliance with international law.  
Due to the lack of responses from Libya, many of its recommendations were not fully 
satisfied. It could be argued that Libya responded to recommendations that encouraged it to take 
actions to empower women which Libya did by establishing a research committee on sexual 
violence and passing a law that gave women legal, financial, and medical assistance if they were 
raped in the revolution. On the contrary, Libya failed to answer recommendations which 




promoted women’s roles in social, economic, and political life. None of Libya’s responses fully 
dealt with these recommendations. Moreover, Libya failed to address recommendations to stop 
domestic violence, and recommendations to empower women in the economy.  
 
3.4 The United Arab Emirates 
The UAE is ratified to the CEDAW, but not to its Optional Protocol. It has a low freedom level 
with a rating of 17 out of 100 according to the Freedom House Index. The UAE portrays how a 
state only ratified to a general convention complies with international law. 
 
3.4.1 Rights Abuses 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) violates the rights of women in marriage, fails to protect 
women from domestic violence, and discriminates against women in the legal system. Amnesty 
International (2018) summarizes, “Women remained subject to discrimination in law and in 
practice, notably in matters of marriage and divorce, inheritance and child custody. They were 
inadequately protected against sexual violence and violence within the family.” Personal status 
laws do not protect women. Law No. 28 of 2005, legislation on marriage rights and inheritance, 
was heavily criticized. Human Rights Watch noted that Federal Law No. 28 of 2005 
discriminates against women because it allows males to conclude a woman’s marriage, men can 
divorce their marriage by themselves, but women must obtain a court order, women are required 
to have sexual relations with their husbands, and women are required to obey their husbands 
commands (​UNHRC​ 2017a, 8). Law No. 28 of 2005 was criticized again by the UN stating that 
“women’s rights under personal status laws, such as Federal Law No. 28 (2005), remained in 




need of development, as they continued to fall outside of the provisions of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 6). Men can also 
stop their wives from working or determine what their occupation is and limit their movement 
under Articles 71 and 72 of the Personal Status Law (​UNHRC​ 2017a, 5). Marital rape is not a 
crime (Human Rights Watch 2018). In addition, there were further concerns over the required 
male guardianship of women, the inability for women to sign their marriage contracts, the 
dowry, the requirement to obey the husband, polygamy, and the difficulty for women to get a 
divorce (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Men can get a divorce for any reason and end the marriage by 
themselves, but women must go through a legal process to get a divorce (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7).  
Women were discriminated against in terms of passing on their nationality. There was a 
2011 decree ordered that children born to Emirati women and foreign fathers will be Emiratis 
once they reach the age of majority (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). However, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women maintained that women were still discriminated 
against conferring their nationality to children compared to men, and it recommended to let 
women pass their nationality on to their children and foreign husband  (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). 
Likewise, men are allowed to transfer their nationality to their foreign wife and kids, but women 
are not granted the same right (​UNHRC​ 2017a, 8).  
Also, women are victims of domestic violence. Human Rights Watch (2018) asserts that 
Article 53 of the penal code gives permission to men to beat their wives and children so long as 
it leaves no physical marks and does not “exceed the limits of Islamic law.” This law was 
legitimized in a 2010 Federal Supreme Court ruling that cited Article 53 (Human Rights Watch 
2018). The UN announced that women faced violence because of the criminalization of 




consensual sex outside of marriage defined in Article 356 of the Penal Code (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). 
The law was used to arrest victims of human trafficking, sexual exploitation, abuse, and women 
prostitutes (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Furthermore, women affected by this law were subjected to 
torture, the death penalty, stoning, and flogging (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7).  
The legal system discriminates against women. Women have a hard time accessing legal 
resources, especially in the case of domestic violence, due to “the negative attitudes of law 
enforcement officials towards women denouncing acts of violence committed against them” 
(​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Foreign women face even harsher discrimination because of a lack of 
interpretation services, legal aid, and crueler sentences (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Moreover, there is 
observed gender bias, stereotypes, and discrimination in the legal system (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). 
Women cannot be judges or prosecutors and are underrepresented in the legal system (​UNHRC 
2017b, 7).  
 
3.4.2 Universal Periodic Review Recommendations 
The UAE was given 180 recommendations. It fully accepted 100 of them and 30 were about 
women’s rights. Some recommendations urged the UAE to continue its implementation of the 
National Strategy for the Advancement of Women in the United Arab Emirates, 2013-2017. 
Other recommendations dealt with general women empowerment and women’s representation in 
decisionmaking positions. 
 
3.4.2.1 Recommendations on the UAE National Strategy 




The UAE was recommended to “Accelerate its efforts in women’s empowerment and gender 
equality, including through the updated National Strategy for the Advancement of Women in the 
United Arab Emirates, 2013-2017” (Indonesia) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), to “Steadily implement the 
National Strategy for the Advancement of Women” (Japan) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), to “Work on 
renewing the National Strategy to empower women by integrating additional programmes and 
projects to strengthen the role of women as a main partner in the development process” (Egypt) 
UNHRC​ 2013, 20), and to “Continue enhancing its efforts on strengthening women’s rights 
through its National Strategy for the Advancement of Women” (Malaysia) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20).  
 
3.4.2.2 Recommendations on General Empowerment 
Other recommendations dealt with promoting the general empowerment and equality of women 
in public life. For example, proposals included to “Continue its efforts to promote gender 
equality and eliminate discrimination against women and girls” (Singapore) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), 
to “Continue putting forward effective measures for the protection and promotion of the rights of 
women in the country” (Azerbaijan) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), to “Take efforts in the area of 
promotion and protection of women’s rights so as to ensure that women are fully integrated into 
the development dynamics of the country” (Burkina Faso) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), and to “Continue 
to pay attention to promoting gender equality and eliminating discrimination against women” 
(Sudan) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20). Two recommendations advocated for changes to be made to the 
UAE constitution. They were to “Fully incorporate in the Constitution or other national 
legislation the principle of equality between men and women” (Chile) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20) and 




to “Undertake efforts to integrate in the Constitution, or other national legislation, the principle 
of equality between men and women and related regulations” (Ecuador) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20).  
 
3.4.2.3 Recommendations on Representation in Decisionmaking  
In addition, a group of recommendations were concerned about women’s representation in 
decision making. These recommendations included to “Continue its efforts in the field of women 
participation in high level positions of decision-making and in all areas of society” (Angola) 
(​UNHRC​ 2013, 21), to “Continue to work towards increasing the representation of women in 
leading and decision-making positions” (Sudan) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), and to “Continue with the 
necessary legislations to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of women and their 
role in society, including the enhancement of their participation in the State institutions, and 
achieve full equality in employment opportunities” (Egypt) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20).  
 
3.4.2.4 Other Recommendations 
Two recommendations were made about the legal system and domestic violence. One was made 
about the legal system of the UAE which urged the state to “Ensure that women have full access 
to justice, obtain equal legal capacity and are treated equally in courts” (Lichtenstein) (​UNHRC 
2013, 20), while the other was about domestic violence and noted to “take active measures to 
reduce social elements that could contribute to acquiescence or passivity with regard to domestic 
violence as demonstrated in its UPR report” (South Korea) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20-21).  
 
3.4.2.5 Declined Recommendations  




The recommendations the UAE declined or took note of were all about personal status laws 
relating to marriage. The UAE declined a recommendation which stated to “Reform the 
legislation with a view to providing women with equal rights in marriage, divorce, property 
relations, the custody of children and inheritance” (Lichtenstein) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), to 
“Continue to introduce amendments to its national family law to ensure equal status and rights 
for women, in all matters” (Canada) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 20), and to “Introduce legislation to prohibit 
the rights of men to physically punish their wives” (Denmark) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 21). On a similar 
note, the UAE did not accept a recommendation which suggested to eliminate “all forms of 
discrimination which may persist with regard to arrangements of divorce and the ways in which 
domestic violence is dealt with” (France) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 21) and to give “women equal status to 
men in matters of divorce, inheritance and child custody” (Norway) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 21). The last 
two recommendations that were not accepted urged the UAE to “achieve legal equality between 
men and women in terms of marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody” (Germany) 
(​UNHRC​ 2013, 21) and to “repeal the right of a husband to punish his wife and the right of 
parents or custodians to punish their minor children by means of physical violence or coercion” 
(Germany) (​UNHRC​ 2013, 21).  
 
3.4.3 Domestic Responses to the International Community 
The UAE was criticized for not allowing human rights groups to enter the state (Human Rights 
Watch 2018) and for responding poorly to UN recommendations (Amnesty International 2018; 
UNHRC​ 2017a, 2). In spite of this, the UAE conveyed that women are well represented in the 
workplace. The state indicated that “Emirati women comprise 43 per cent of the workforce and 




hold 66 percent of governmental sector positions, including 30 percent of senior decision-making 
posts” (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 13). Also, women are working more in the judicial sector. The UAE 
asserts that “Women now work as prosecutors and judges within the judiciary and the Office of 
the Public Prosecutor. There are also increasing numbers of women in the police and the 
military” ​UNHRC​ 2017c, 15). In addition, the state suggests that its Emirates Businesswomen 
Council has helped get more women involved in the economy (​UNHRC ​2017c, 15). In fact, 
22,000 women are registered with the state’s department of commerce and participate in 
domestic and international markets (​UNHRC ​2017c, 15).  
The UAE drafted The National Strategy for the Empowerment and Advancement of 
Emirati Women (2015–2021). This program sets the goals for local and federal governments and 
private and civil institutions on how to give women “decent” lives (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 13). Still, the 
UN held that the “the practical implementation of the national strategy for the empowerment and 
advancement of Emirati women remained unclear” (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 2). Moreover, in 2014 the 
UAE Cabinet made a decision that requires women to be included on boards of all government 
organizations, institutions, and companies (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 13). The Presidential Decree of 2011 
gave women the ability to confer their nationality to their children once the child has reached the 
age of majority if the husband is a foreigner (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). 
The UAE boasted about the representation of women in governing and decision making 
positions. The UN congratulated the UAE on having 30% of government leadership positions 
being held by women (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Still, it condemned the UAE for not having enough 
women in the Federal National Council and the judiciary (​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). Likewise, the UN 
praised the UAE for Cabinet Decision 319/15F/22 which gives assistance to women to gain 




leadership roles on the boards of directors of the federal government, companies, and institutions 
(​UNHRC​ 2017b, 7). However, the UN was still concerned that the law lacked a strategy and 
would have a hard time being translated into actual policies. Additionally, there were 9 female 
members of the Federal National Council out of 40, making the council 22.5% women (​UNHRC 
2017c, 13). The UAE Cabinet has 8 female members out of 29 which the UAE proclaims is one 
of the highest figures in the world (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 15). The Ministry of Happiness and the 
Ministry of Tolerance are both led by women (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 15). Finally, 30% of the workers 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation are women (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 
15). This equated to 234 women members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation (​UNHRC​ 2017c, 15).  
 
3.4.4 Summary 
The UAE accepted recommendations that dealt with women in the economy, political 
decisionmaking, and general recommendations to empower women in society. Yet, it declined 
any recommendation that made changes to the domestic affairs and power hierarchy between a 
man and woman in marriage. The UAE declined seven recommendations about personal status 
laws. Recommendations that promoted rights relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and 
physical force against wives were declined and are likely to be declined in future UPR sessions. 
The UAE also rejected two recommendations that proclaimed to prohibit the right of men to 
physically punish their wives. These declined recommendations are similar to the declined 
recommendation of Libya since they are both about personal status rights. The MENA case 




shows that cultural relativism is practiced in international law and hinders international law 
compliance. 
The National Strategy for the Empowerment and Advancement of Emirati Women 
(2015–2021), the 2011 Presidential Decree, and Cabinet Decision 319/15F/22 are all policies 
taken to address women’s rights and empowerment. The UAE is not ratified to the Optional 
Protocol, but it still made some contributions to empowering women. So, the Optional Protocol 
is not a major variable that influences a state’s behavior towards international law. 
The UAE delivered on most of its recommendations. The recommendations on a national 
strategy for the empowerment of women were responded to because of the National Strategy for 
the Empowerment and Advancement of Emirati Women (2015-2021). These recommendations 
urged the UAE to continue promoting women’s rights under its national strategy. Furthermore, 
the UAE fulfilled its recommendations by that advocated to continue to protect the equality of 
men and women. This was fulfilled through the National Strategy for the Empowerment and 
Advancement of Emirati Women, the Businesswomen’s Council, the 2011 Presidential Decree, 
and Cabinet Decision 319/15F/22. These policies all empowered women in different areas like 
with economic rights, representation in decisionmaking, and the ability to pass down their 
nationality to their children. Moreover, the UAE addressed its recommendations about women’s 
representation in decisionmaking roles. Three recommendations were about increasing women’s 
participation in decisionmaking. Cabinet Decision 319/15F/22 was passed to help women get on 
the boards of private enterprises and government institutions which satisfied those 
recommendations.  




The UAE failed to uphold two of its recommendations. One suggested to treat women 
equally under the law, and the other asserted to reduce social elements that lead to domestic 
violence. The UAE made no new changes to deal with these recommendations.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Comparison and Analysis 
Four comparisons can be made from the case studies. First, the two European states can be 
compared to each other, and the two MENA states can be compared to each other. This 
comparison reveals if states ratified to the Optional Protocol are more likely to comply with 
international law than states that are not ratified to it. This also reveals if there are any behavioral 
differences between states from the same region. Next, states that ratified the Optional Protocol 
can be compared to states that did not ratify the Optional Protocol from both regions. For 
example, the states that did ratify the Optional Protocol, Sweden and Libya, can be compared to 
the states that did not, Latvia and the UAE. Finally, comparisons can be made between each 
region. These comparisons depict if ratification to the Optional Protocol makes states more 
compliant with international law, and if region and culture affect compliance with international 
law.  
 
4.1 General Conventions versus Specific Protocols  
First, Sweden and Latvia can be compared. This comparison will reveal if European states follow 
international law in a similar way or not. Also, it tests whether ratification to the Optional 
Protocol affects state behavior. Both states had problems of domestic violence and women being 




unequal in the economy. Sweden accepted 71% of its recommendations, whereas Latvia 
accepted 58% (Table 5). While there may be a difference in accepted recommendations, both 
states added new policies to address women’s rights. Most of Sweden’s policies focused around 
researching and raising awareness on domestic violence. Also, Sweden took action to research 
better ways for police to address domestic violence, and the police have started to encourage 
victims of domestic violence to report their cases. Sweden and Latvia both augmented the 
capacity of their shelters to provide assistance for victims of domestic violence. Both states made 
progress in ratifying new women’s rights treaties. Sweden ratified the Istanbul Convention, and 
Latvia is making changes in its domestic laws to ratify the same treaty by the end of 2018. 
Sweden has introduced the Golden Rules of Leadership Program and the Delegation for Gender 
Equality in Working Life to reduce the wage gap, help women work in all sectors of the 
economy, and increase the number of female entrepreneurs.  
Table 5: Accepted UPR Recommendations  
State Sweden Latvia Libya UAE 
Total  149 122 120 180 
Accepted 106 71 115 100 
Percent 71 58 95 55 
 
Latvia made changes to its laws by criminalizing marital rape. Moreover, the ​Concept of 
Preventive Coercive Measures, State Family Policy Guidelines (2011-2017), and the Action Plan 
(2012-2014) all intend to reduce the number of domestic violence cases in Latvia. In the 
economy, Latvia passed the Gender Equality in Economic Decision Making and Guidelines on 




Inclusive Employment to raise awareness around the gender gap and to reduce workplace 
segregation based on sex. Lastly, the Gender Equality Actions Plan is a general plan to empower 
women in society, in the workplace, and to remove gender stereotypes.  
Sweden and Latvia both responded effectively to the UPR and made changes to their 
national policies to adhere to international standards (Table 6). There were no critical differences 
between the states. Both had the same problems in terms of domestic violence and women’s 
economic rights, and both responded. They even responded in similar ways such as both 
improving their shelters for domestic violence victims, funding research on women’s rights, and 
raising awareness of domestic violence and women’s economic rights. The only difference that 
was mentioned is the fact that Sweden accepted much more recommendations than Latvia did. 
This is likely due to the attitudes that each state has to other areas of human rights that are 
outside of women’s rights. In other words, the attitudes towards other human rights like torture, 
civil and political rights, and the rights of refugees may explain why Sweden accepted more 
recommendations than Latvia.  
Furthermore, it is inferred that states that ratify the Optional Protocol are likely to accept 
more recommendations than states that have not ratified it. While Latvia accepted nearly all of its 
recommendations on women’s rights specifically and responded with many domestic policies, it 
accepted far less recommendations in total than Sweden. On the other hand, Sweden which 
ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW has accepted more recommendations in total than 
Latvia which is only ratified to the general treaty. States that accede to the Optional Protocols in 
general are more likely to be compliant and cooperative with international human rights 
institutions than states that have not ratified Optional Protocols. Optional Protocols are strict and 




specific agreements that can hold states accountable for any human rights violations. So, states 
that ratify the Optional Protocols are expected to be more protective of human rights and have 
less overall violations. However, this is not evident with Sweden and Latvia since they had 
similar human rights violations and responded to the violations in the same way. Between 
Sweden and Latvia, the Optional Protocol cannot be said to influence state compliance with 
international law standards. The greatest evidence of this is how Latvia responded to the UPR. 
Latvia passed more policies than Sweden (Table 6) despite only being ratified to the general 
CEDAW and not the Optional Protocol. Therefore, the Optional Protocol does not cause states to 
be more compliant with international human rights standards.  
So, what drove Latvia to take such an active response to the UN’s recommendations? It 
could be possible that the UPR process influenced Latvia to pass these new laws. Yet, it is also 
probable that the sovereignty and autonomy of Latvia has caused it to pass these new laws too. 
Latvia’s response cannot be fully attributed to the UPR process because it has declined some of 
the specific recommendations on women’s rights, and more importantly, rejected about a half of 
its other recommendations. If these major policy changes happened in Latvia because of the UPR 
process, then Latvia would likely have accepted more recommendations than just 58% of them. 
It would be expected that if Latvia trusted the recommendations of the UPR for women’s rights, 
then it would also trust the UPR for policies on other areas of human rights which would lead 
Latvia to accept more recommendations in total. Nevertheless, the total accepted 
recommendations of Latvia is low compared to Sweden which suggests that Latvia prioritizes its 
sovereignty and self interest over the solutions of international law. In fact, Latvia declined two 
recommendations that advocated for a gender equality bill and to define discrimination in its 




constitution because those legal methods were not compatible with the Latvian legal system. 
This is a case where Latvia demonstrates its sovereignty in opposition to international law 
requirements. Another level of analysis is Latvia’s domestic constituents. While this level of 
analysis was outside the scope of this study, it is possible that domestic political movements and 
demands influenced Latvia to pass some of its new laws as well. Therefore, the sovereignty of 
Latvia is likely the main explanation for its active response to the UPR.  
The same conclusions on Latvia can be applied to Sweden. The Optional Protocol has 
likely not caused Sweden to change its behavior on women’s rights, but rather its sovereignty is 
responsible for the changes. While Sweden accepted more recommendations than Latvia, the 
Optional Protocol and the amount of total accepted recommendations had no impact on the 
responses to enhance women’s rights. Sweden is a notoriously progressive state which has a 
perfect 100 point score on the Freedom House Index. It is likely that Sweden’s domestic 
responses were done because they are in the interests of the state itself, and not because they are 
desirable by international law. Indeed, Sweden got recommendations to increase women’s 
representation in decisionmaking, but it did not list any policies that addressed those 
recommendations. This is probably because women’s representation in decisionmaking in 
Sweden is already high so it was not a major concern for the government. So, Sweden has a 
domestic interest in promoting women’s rights which means Sweden can create policies to 












Table 6: Domestic Policies in Response to International Law 
Sweden Latvia Libya  UAE 
Improved capacity of 




Established a research 





Improved shelters for 
domestic violence 
victims 
Concept of Preventive 
Coercive Measures 
2014 Ministerial 
Decree (not passed into 
law) 
National Strategy for 
the Empowerment and 
Advancement of 
Emirati Women 
  (2015–2021) 
Spent $111 million on 
domestic violence 
programs 
 State Family Policy 
Guidelines (2011-2017) 
Council of Ministers 
War Victims Law 
Presidential Decree of 
2011 




Ratified the African 
Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the 




Delegation for Gender 
Equality in Working 
Life 




Golden Rules of 
Leadership Program 




 Guidelines on Inclusive 
Employment in 2015 
  




 Gender Equality 
Actions Plan 
  





Sweden and Latvia were compared to identify any distinctions between European states. 
Now, the MENA states can be compared to each other. The biggest difference between Libya 
and the UAE is over the amount of accepted recommendations. Libya has accepted 95% of its 
recommendations, while the UAE has accepted 55% (Table 5). This is significant because in the 
European cases and the MENA cases, the states that ratified the Optional Protocol both accepted 
more recommendations than the states that did not ratify the Optional Protocol. Both MENA 
states had similar rights violations in the forms of domestic violence and personal status laws 
like rights relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the passing down of nationality. A 
second difference is that the UAE passed new measures to get women involved in the economy 
and in government, whereas Libya passed laws that combated sexual violence. This illustrates 
that the UAE is content empowering women in economics and government, but not in domestic 
affairs concerning marriage and family affairs. Libya took no steps to empower women in 
economics or government. Like the UAE, Libya declined one recommendation about marriage 
laws, inheritance, and divorce. This rejection portrays that opposition to marriage equality is a 
regional and cultural trend.  
As was stated, Libya had a hard time implementing new policies because of the political 
instability after the revolution. Still, the state has tried to make progress in women’s rights. A 
research committee on domestic violence was established. One of its tasks was to determine 




reparations for victims of sexual violence. The 2014 Ministerial Decree would give women 
access to legal resources to help them sue perpetrators of domestic violence and other assistance 
like healthcare. Unfortunately, this law has not been passed. Women raped during the revolution 
were considered war victims which gave them access to additional health and psychological care, 
and helped them bring the perpetrators to justice. Lastly, Libya displayed its commitment to 
women’s rights by ratifying a regional human rights treaty, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.  
The UAE continued to use the Emirates Businesswomen Council which has helped 
increase the number of women running private enterprises. The National Strategy for the 
Empowerment and Advancement of Emirati Women (2015-2021) is a national strategy to 
empower women in the state, and the 2014 Presidential Decree gave women the right to transfer 
their nationality to their children once they reach the age of majority. This policy addressed some 
of the recommendations made by the UPR about marriage and family laws despite being rejected 
by the UAE. Finally, Cabinet Decision 319/15F/22 promoted the ability for women to be 
members of the boards of government institutions and enterprises.  
The UAE ostensibly has made better progress than Libya with women’s rights in spite of 
accepting less recommendations. The UAE adopted a national strategy for women’s rights, 
crafted policy to bolster female representation in government and in the economy, has an 
economic organization to help women become involved in the economy, and gave women the 
right to pass down their nationality to their children while marrying a foreign spouse. These laws 
may not be perfect and while the UAE still has other women’s rights concerns, these policies 
address different areas of women’s rights and demonstrates that the UAE is aware of the 




importance of women in economics and government. On the other hand, Libya accepted a lot of 
recommendations, but was unable to translate them into policy likely because of internal political 
dynamics, and not necessarily because of opposition towards international law. The domestic 
violence fact finding group was ineffective, and the ratification of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa is mostly a symbolic gesture and may not 
directly cause new policy. In summary, the UAE accepted less recommendations than Libya, but 
had stronger policies towards women’s rights. 
The recommendation acceptance rate of Libya is the highest of the other states. Libya 
accepted 95% of its recommendations (Table 5). While this high acceptance rate may look like 
international law is changing the behavior of Libya, sovereignty still affects Libya under 
international law. The Gaddafi regime fell the same year as the UPR process for Libya, and with 
a new era in governance for Libya, promoting and protecting human rights may be a core interest 
of the state. The UPR recommendations still have to be within the interests of the state to be 
accepted and implemented. Even if a state like Libya accepts an extreme amount of 
recommendations, it is still up to the state to design and implement effective policies. This means 
that international law can do little to protect human rights in a state that has poor human rights 
laws. With Libya, it accepted a lot of recommendations, but failed to make any significant 
difference in women’s rights compared to the other case studies. For the Libyan people to enjoy 
human rights, the government has to protect them itself. International law does not have the 
legitimacy nor authority to intervene and protect the citizens of a state. The point is that 
sovereignty continues to be an influence on state behavior under international law, and that the 
state is responsible for upholding human rights instead of international law.  




The UAE is another case that portrays how ratification to the Optional Protocol does not 
cause states to be more protective of human rights than states with no ratification. The UAE is 
not ratified to the Optional Protocol, but it passed more effective laws than Libya which is 
ratified to the Optional Protocol. The UAE appears to be more successful than Libya because it 
has more political stability. As mentioned, Libya experienced turmoil and intrastate violence 
which prevented it from making new laws. Still, the UAE accepted 55% of its recommendations 
which suggests that the other recommendations were not in the self interest of the UAE. 
So, does the Optional Protocol change state behavior? Not exactly. Latvia is not ratified 
to the Optional Protocol, but implemented many new policies, even more than Sweden (Table 6). 
Similarly, the UAE is not ratified to the Optional Protocol, and it issued new laws that were more 
effective than the policies of Libya. Therefore, ratification to the Optional Protocol does not have 
a significant impact on state behavior. Ratifying the Optional Protocol will not automatically 
improve the human rights practices of a state. The sovereignty and self interest of the state will 
determine if human rights are protected. The state has to believe in and be committed to 
protecting human rights if human rights are going to be enjoyed by its citizens. Individual state 
practices and laws protect human rights more than efforts from international law. However, 
ratification was correlated with a higher amount of accepted recommendations. Sweden accepted 
71% of its recommendation and Libya accepted 95%. On the contrary, Latvia accepted 58% of 
its recommendations and the UAE accepted 55%. This suggests that states that ratified the 
Optional Protocol are more accepting and supportive of the international human rights regime 
than states that did not ratify the Optional Protocol. Indeed, Sweden and Libya both ratified new 




human rights treaties further portraying that ratification to the Optional Protocol generates 
support and cooperation of international human rights treaties.  
The second hypothesis was not proven. Ratification to the Optional Protocol made no 
difference in changing state behavior towards protecting women’s rights. This was observed with 
Latvia and the UAE. Both of these states were not ratified to the Optional Protocol, but still 
passed more laws than Sweden and Libya which are ratified to the Optional Protocol (Table 6). 
The Optional Protocol has no impact on state behavior because it does nothing to directly shape 
state human rights policies. Again, human rights are only protected if the protection of human 
rights is within the interests of the state. If a state does not want to protect human rights, 
international law has no power to change the state’s behavior. For human rights to be fully 
protected, the state has to protect them itself, not international law. The UAE and Latvia passed 
new laws without being ratified to the Optional Protocol because it was in their self interest to do 
so. Hence, ratification to the Optional Protocol does not change state behavior to be more 
responsive to international law standards.  
 
4.2 Regional Comparison 
The MENA case highlights how cultural relativism and sovereignty affect state behavior over 
international law. The UAE and Libya only declined recommendations about marriage equality, 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance, and were condemned by the UN for violating these 
personal status laws. These recommendations were aimed at making women equal to men in 
their domestic and familial affairs, yet any recommendation of this nature was declined. Both 
states accepted recommendations about giving women economic rights and political rights, but 




not when it came to rights that would shift the power hierarchy in household relationships 
between a husband and wife. This set of rejected recommendations and the cultural reservations 
illustrated in Table 4 reveal that cultural relativism can hinder state compliance with 
international law requirements. The culture reservations are significant in this context because 
MENA used most of its culture reservations in the CEDAW and not the other major treaties. The 
same pattern is true with the sovereignty reservations since most of MENA’s sovereignty 
reservations are concentrated in the CEDAW. The rejected recommendations on personal status 
laws and the culture and sovereignty reservations convey that culture and sovereignty have more 
legitimacy than international law and compel states to avoid following international standards.  
How does Europe compare to MENA? In some cases, they are alike. For example, both 
regions have problems with domestic violence, and both want women to be more involved in the 
economy. Also, Sweden and Libya ratified new human rights treaties during their UPR process. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences between the regions. First, the MENA states had unique 
human rights violations with marriage equality, divorce, inheritance, and nationality laws. These 
issues were not prevalent in the European states examined. Second, the MENA states did not 
mention a gender wage gap and a willingness to reduce it like the European states did. So, 
European states had a bigger concern about the gender gap than the MENA states. Third, the 
European states were more active in creating new policies to address women’s rights than the 
MENA states. Latvia had many new national policies to improve the lives of women, and 
Sweden funded various research campaigns and civil society groups that fight domestic violence. 
The MENA states still passed new laws, but not to the same magnitude as the European states. 
Sovereignty and self interest still guided both regions under international law since they use 




treaty reservations and pick and choose what recommendations they wanted to fulfil. 
Additionally, cultural relativism is evident in the declined recommendations of the MENA 
group, and no cultural relativism is displayed in the European states. Both MENA states declined 
recommendations about marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and physical abuse. 
Therefore, cultural relativism and the amount of new policies are vital differences between the 
European states and the MENA states.  
The first hypothesis was proven. The European group responded to the recommendations 
with more policies than the MENA group (Table 6). This is likely because the European cases 
have political stability with strong government institutions that can make changes to address 
human rights concerns. The European group also had higher freedom levels than the MENA 
group (Table 2) which may have played a role in their responsiveness. States that have higher 
freedom levels have more respect for human rights. So, it makes sense that states with more 
respect for human rights responded to the recommendations with more policies than states with 
low freedom levels. Conversely, states with low freedom levels are less likely to protect human 
rights than states with high levels. Therefore, states with low freedom levels are expected to not 
respond with many new policies that address human rights concerns.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This study examined if international law can change the behavior of states towards protecting 
women’s rights. The major findings are that the European group, Sweden and Latvia, responded 
with more governmental action than the MENA group, Libya and the UAE. Still, the MENA 
group did make changes in its domestic laws to support women, just not to the same extent as the 




European group. Furthermore, each region experienced different human rights concerns and 
violations. Domestic violence and the gender wage gap were two primary violations in the 
European cases, whereas domestic violence and personal status violations were concentrated in 
the MENA cases. The Optional Protocol had little effect on complying with international law 
standards. The UAE had more effective policies than Libya despite not ratifying the Optional 
Protocol. Likewise, Latvia adopted many new laws into its domestic sphere to empower women 
while not being ratified to the Optional Protocol. Ratification to the Optional Protocol is 
correlated with a higher number of accepted recommendations and more support of international 
human rights institutions than states with no ratification status. To conclude, hypothesis one was 
proven. The European group was more responsive and compliant with international law 
standards than the MENA group. To the contrary, hypothesis two was unfounded. Ratification to 
the Optional Protocol has no effect on responding and complying with international law 
standards. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to say with certainty that there is causation between international 
law and state behavior. Of course, states do not accept every single recommendation from the 
UN. It appears to be the case that states accept recommendations and make changes to their 
domestic laws as long as they are compatible with the states’ values and sovereignty. For 
international law requirements to be embraced, they have to coincidentally overlap with the 
standards and capacities of the state. A top-down system is created where international law 
passes down legal requirements to the states. However, states can filter what they want to accept 
and protect, and what they do not. International law is too compatible with state sovereignty. The 
enforcement of treaties, treaty reservations, and cultural relativism illustrate how states still have 




great power in international law. Overall, state sovereignty and autonomy are still prioritized 
over international law.  
So, does this prove that international law works? It depends on the expectations that 
citizens, states, and international legal institutions themselves have of international law. Is 
international law suppose to be compatible with state sovereignty, or is it suppose to directly 
intervene in the domestic affairs of a state? Is international law only responsible for transferring 
legal requirements to states from a top-down approach? If international law is only to transfer 
legal standards, then it is partially succeeding. It is partially successful because some standards 
are accepted and others are rejected. The domestic laws passed illustrate that states are accepting 
some legal standards and trying to materialize them into policies. Yet, even though there may be 
new laws, this does not mean that the laws will be effective and actually work. In this sense, a 
balance is struck between international law and the state. International law passes down legal 
standards to the state, the state picks which standards it wants to follow, and then it is responsible 
for implementing meaningful policies to enforce those standards. Yet, there are still major 
hurdles to international law compliance. Sovereignty and cultural relativism determine what 
standards the state follows and if the state complies with international law. Ultimately, 
international law does have the power to promote human rights, but the practice and protection 
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